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Background 
Russ Hurlburt: When the editor of the American Journal of Psychology suggested a cross-review 
of my book Investigating Pristine Inner Experience: Moments of Truth (hereafter IPIE) and Liu 
and Perry’s Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (hereafter CatS), I was ambivalent. 
Certainly I would like to contribute to a critical comparison of those two books because 
(obviously) I think the subject matter is important. 
 On the other hand, it didn’t seem fair to suggest that I, of all people, review CatS because 
I have repeatedly and publicly (some might say stridently) called for studies of consciousness 
that ground themselves in carefully collected observations of experience, and the essays in CatS 
were likely (I had not yet seen CatS) to fall short of that (important by my lights but not 
universally accepted) standard. 
 So I suggested to the editors that I might write a “review” that highlights the differences 
(if any) between the manners in which CatS and IPIE ground themselves in observations of 
phenomena, hopefully to contribute to science’s grappling with this issue. That would be a 
natural sequel to discussions in IPIE and elsewhere, particularly in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel 
(2007) and the collection of articles in the special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies 
(2011, 18(1)). 
 I suggested that if the AJP editor was inclined to support this plan, they should give Liu 
and Perry the right to veto it or to write a rejoinder to my “review.” 
 I further suggested that I be allowed to enlist a coauthor. I have often found it desirable to 
refine or amend ideas through collaboration with colleagues who are not (or at least not 
necessarily) like-minded (e.g., my collaborations with Schwitzgebel). The editors accepted that 
condition as well, so I recruited Susan Stuart, a philosopher with whom I had discussed some 
related issues, who was knowledgeable about IPIE, but who was not (or at least not necessarily) 
a partisan in the grounding-in-experience issue. This review is the result. 
 CatS is an edited collection, so it is not necessary that the individual contributors share 
the same point of view, and it is clear that they differ on several important matters--otherwise the 
individual essays would be of little significance. However, they all share a central concern, that 
of understanding the nature of conscious experience. Stuart and I found that there were indeed 
important differences between the CatS and IPIE groundings in observations of phenomena: the 
contributors to CatS do not cite a single example of actually occurring inner experience whereas 
IPIE provides over a hundred examples of concretely-existing-at-some-moment, carefully 
examined inner experience. This “review” explores that difference. 
 
Review 
Some might claim that there are indeed examples of experience in CatS and that we’re attacking 
a straw man; others might claim that considering actual experience is unnecessary to the 
understanding-consciousness enterprise, that a lively theoretical imagination and its analysis are 
sufficient, so it might be constructive to examine a few excerpts from CatS. 
Example 1 
Rosenthal writes: 
Consider John Perry’s well-known example, in which I see a trail of sugar apparently spilling 
from somebody’s grocery cart and, not realizing that it is spilling from my cart, think that the 
person spilling sugar, whoever it is, is making a mess. (Rosenthal, CatS, p. 28) 
 We hold that this is probably not a description of an actually occurring thought, much 
less a description of Perry’s actually occurring experiences during that episode. This may be 
easier to grasp if we consult Perry’s original example: 
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one 
side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell 
him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I 
seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. 
(Perry, 1979, p. 3) 
 Perry’s several trips around the counter must have unfolded over a minute or so, during 
which time there was doubtless a series of thoughts and/or experiences, some related, some not 
at all related to the sugar. We, of course, have no direct access to Perry’s thoughts or experience, 
but the stream of his actual experiences during that event was more likely to have been 
something like this: That’s a gritty sound; sugar--yuk; where’s that sugar coming from? Maybe 
it’s that pretty girl I just passed; I’ll follow her trail; this is a mess; people should be more 
careful; what should I tell the Nous editors? Where’d she go? Damn. Seems like it’s thicker than 
before--that’s weird. I don’t like their suggestions. To hell with them. It is thicker! No, that’s not 
possible. Ah--ketchup! I almost forgot it--good thing I came back this way. There’s two trails 
now. I’m sure there weren’t two trails before. Oh! The sugar’s mine. 
 That is, of course, one greatly oversimplified fantasy about Perry’s experience as it might 
actually have presented itself to him between 3:37 and 3:38 pm as he did his grocery shopping. 
According to this fantasy, had Perry been wearing a DES beeper that happened to beep at 
3:37:31, his pristine experience would have been about what to tell the Nous editors. 
 Our fantasy suggests that Perry’s experience is quite meanderingly diverse, and that “the 
person spilling sugar, whoever it is, is making a mess” likely substantially oversimplifies Perry’s 
actual experience. 
 Rosenthal might respond that he (and consciousness science in general) is not interested 
in Perry’s experience between 3:37 and 3:38--he is interested in Perry’s thinking, a state in which 
Perry found himself throughout his sugar search, so it makes sense to say that between 3:37 and 
3:38 Perry was thinking that the person spilling the sugar, whoever it is, is making a mess. 
However, we fear that by declining to specify the actual experiential details of the occasion 
under consideration, Rosenthal is likely to fail to grasp in some substantial way the nature of the 
thought process--namely that it might be discursive and varied. 
 The reader might respond that our characterization of Perry’s experience is a fantasy, and 
that we have no justification for drawing conclusions about Perry’s thinking from our fantasy 
about Perry’s experience. We wholeheartedly agree, and that is exactly the point; IPIE holds that 
consciousness science should be highly skeptical about accounts of consciousness (whether our 
own or Perry’s or Rosenthal’s) that are not grounded in careful descriptions of actual moments of 
experience (not fantasies thereabout) from a variety of individuals in a variety of situations. By 
contrast, Rosenthal and the other contributors to CatS seem to hold that it is possible, indeed 
desirable or even necessary, to explore consciousness without encountering particular instances 
of immediate experience. 
 We (and IPIE) fear that without grounding in carefully apprehended moments of actual 
experience, Rosenthal invites his CatS readers to enter into an unnoticed collusion: to seem to 
agree that there was such and such a thought, to seem to agree about the structural and contentful 
characteristics of that thought, to seem to accept that such a thought would stay the same despite 
disparate experiences, to seem to accept that it is quite natural to have such a thought in such a 
condition, and therefore to seem to believe that the thought provides evidence about the nature of 
consciousness. However, we fear none of that is the case; it seems likely that Perry’s thinking 
meanders substantially during the sugar episode, much as the (hypothetical) experience 
meanders. 
 By contrast, IPIE tries to cleave faithfully, again and again, to directly apprehended inner 
experience. It holds that fantasies about experience (including, perhaps especially, our own 
fantasies) are not to be trusted and should, instead, be resolutely avoided. Therefore IPIE 
provides, again and again, carefully apprehended bits of experience, and then, in an explicitly 
inductive process, tries to provide faithful characterizations of those bits. 
 
Example 2 
Our example in the previous section tried to make clear the main difference between the two 
approaches: that in their attempts to make headway in the understanding of people, IPIE relies on 
directly apprehended moments of experience; CatS does not. This difference has important 
ramifications. Let’s take an example from Perry’s CatS chapter to open up some of the 
ramifications of that distinction. 
Perhaps [President] Clinton ran his office like this. Each morning a schedule was printed out for 
Clinton and his senior staff, a grid with the names on the left and the hours of the day across the 
top. At about 4 p.m. Clinton would glance at his copy to see where he was supposed to eat 
dinner. He looked for his name . . . in the same way he might have looked for someone else’s 
name, if he wanted to find out where they would be in the early evening . . . In these sorts of 
cases . . . we find information about ourselves in the same way we find out information about 
others. (Perry, CatS, p. 92) 
 It might appear that this looking-to-see-where-to-eat is a description of (Clinton’s) 
experience, but it is not. In particular, to claim, without warrant, that Clinton’s looking is “the 
same” as that of some other senior staff member is to invite the reader into (we think) a 
pernicious collusion. Clinton has engaged in sexual activity with interns, and that may well be an 
important motivation for his looking at the dinner schedule. Clinton may well be looking to 
detect, for example, whether Hillary and Monica are likely to be at the same dinner. Senior 
staffer Smith, who has not engaged in sexual activity with interns, is also looking to see where 
Clinton is supposed to dine, but his looking is not “in the same way” as Clinton’s. The ways of 
looking are, to be sure, similar in that both involve looking for names and locations. But to say 
that they are experientially the same (and if they are not experientially the same, they are not the 
same) is not likely to be true: Clinton would focus intently, feel his pulse quicken, check and 
double check, breathe a sigh of relief, and so on; Smith would glance and go. To describe 
Clinton’s and Smith’s experience in strictly information-gathering terms, as does Perry, is to 
ignore the individual motivations and the affective anticipatory nature of their respective 
inquiries. 
 But we must remember that our main interest is the distinction between CatS and IPIE. 
Like the other CatS writers, Perry does not apprehend inner experience with the fidelity that IPIE 
suggests is necessary for any fruitful attempt at understanding the nature of experience. IPIE 
would say that if you want to know about Clinton’s and Smith’s experience, you have to 
apprehend it carefully. It is likely that if beeps occurred during Clinton’s schedule looking and 
during Smith’s schedule looking (at parallel times, say, 4 seconds after approaching the 
schedule), their apprehended at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience would be very different. 
That is true regardless of the historical Monica; even if Clinton had not engaged in sexual 
activity with interns, there are many other genetic and 
historical/environmental/situational/affective influences which would together produce Clinton’s 
actual pristine experience and make it different from that of Smith who has his own individual 
genetic/environmental/situational/affective history. 
 Perry uses this erroneously assumed sameness as evidence for what he calls the self-
buffer. Whether the self-buffer actually exists is not our interest; our interest is in how CatS and 
IPIE differ in the apprehension of inner experience; we think, in accordance with the position set 
out in IPIE, that one shouldn’t use as evidence something which has the status of mere (to say 
nothing of probably incorrect) assumption. 
 Perhaps you think the situations for Clinton-with-Monica-in-his-life is unusually different 
from Smith-without-Monica-in-his-life; that for most people, seeing one’s own name is the same 
as seeing someone else’s name. We don’t think that is true. It certainly is not true in the hearing 
modality, as the cocktail party phenomenon demonstrates: you perk up when someone behind 
you mentions your name but not when that same person mentions someone else’s name (unless 
that other name has significance for you). Our histories affect us and behaviorally shape our 
enquiries. None of this is acknowledged in Perry’s assumption of sameness. 
 
Example 3 
A third example involves O’Brien’s distinction between the kind of “self-consciousness that 
characterizes our ability to think about ourselves in the first person” and “feeling self-conscious . 
. . as an object represented by others”: 
 First, in central cases, ordinary self-consciousness seems to involve particular 
phenomenological and bodily features. There is a heightened awareness of one’s skin, clothes 
etc.--an awareness of one’s physical externalities. There is an externalized awareness of one’s 
speech and other actions--an awareness about how our sayings and doings come across to others. 
There are sensational and physical reactions: prickles in the back of the neck and elsewhere, 
blushing, turning the head away from a gaze. These phenomenological and bodily features vary 
in nature and intensity. Nevertheless, they are the natural concomitants of the phenomenon of 
ordinary self-consciousness. 
 Second, and essentially, OSC [Ordinary Self-Consciousness] seems to involve a subject 
taking two perspectives on herself: an observer’s perspective and a subject’s perspective. It is my 
thinking about others’ thinking about me . . . It is this simultaneous awareness that it is me, as I 
appear to others, that gives rise to the particular pleasure and pains of self-consciousness. 
(O’Brien, CatS, p. 106-107) 
 Note that O’Brien’s claims here are distinctly about pristine experience: she writes about 
how the skin feels, how our speech sounds, our prickles, our particular pleasures and pains. But 
there is no careful examination of pristine inner experience; in fact, there is no examination of 
pristine experience whatsoever. Instead, O’Brien offers examples in the form of quotations from 
fiction (F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Amory, George Eliot’s Maggie) and more-or-less-related musings 
by Sartre and Nietzsche. 
 The appeal to literature is unexceptional in the consciousness science business; there’s 
even a serious theoretical position proposed by David Lodge (2002) that novelists and poets are 
‘more gifted’ [O’Brien’s phrase] than most to speak and write about experience; but this 
provides yet another perspective on the distinctions between CatS and IPIE. IPIE makes it 
abundantly clear that appealing to literature is not adequate. It is not safe to assume that 
Fitzgerald or Eliot were faithful apprehenders of experience; even if they were, it is not safe to 
assume that in any particular passage they intended to present pure, natural, ordinary self-
consciousness; and even if they did, it is not safe to assume that they are describing universal 
phenomena rather than the idiosyncratic experiences of their particular characters. It seems likely 
that Fitzgerald was presenting some admixture of what he thought might be Amory’s particular 
idiosyncratic reactions to a particular distinct situation along with whatever might be desirable to 
advance the plot or character development. The same is true for Eliot. And Sartre and Nietzsche, 
to the extent they are talking about the same phenomenon (and we will never know if they are), 
do so analytically, without, as far as we can tell, carefully examining a single person’s 
experience, unless you include their own introspection (about the accuracy of which IPIE and 
Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel (2007, 2011b) are skeptical). One might respond by saying that 
Nietzsche, Sartre, Eliot, and Fitzgerald were not concerned with examining moments of pristine 
experience, that they were reaching more deeply, that they intended to speak, in some sense, of 
universals in human nature, characteristics we can all recognize. Yet to move from a singular 
introspective experience to a universal claim about the nature of human experience is 
unwarranted. And that is exactly the point: Nietzsche, Sartre, Eliot, and Fitzgerald’s metaphors, 
conjectures, and narrations are far removed from the descriptions of lived, pristine experience 
that IPIE holds are required. 
 There has not been a Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) study aimed specifically at 
OSC, but DES might contribute to the understanding of OSC in two ways. First, O’Brien holds 
as central to OSC that self-conscious people characteristically have a heightened awareness of 
their skin, clothes etc.--an awareness of their physical externalities. However, DES shows that 
many non-self-conscious people frequently have such awarenesses, which DES calls ‘sensory 
awareness’ (IPIE Chapter 16). Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) reported that some people at nearly 
every DES beep convincingly report sensory awareness. Those people are typically not, as far as 
it is possible to tell, particularly self-conscious. Hence DES would suggest that heightened self-
sensory-awareness is not a sufficient feature of OSC. 
 Second, O’Brien holds that OSC centrally involves two simultaneous perspectives, one of 
which is the “awareness …[of] me, as I appear to others.” DES might be able to shed light on 
that, because, although it was not emphasized in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel (2007), Hurlburt 
suspects that “Melanie,” a DES participant in that book, did have frequent high levels of OSC as 
O’Brien would define it (there is no way of knowing for sure, because O’Brien does not specify 
how one decides whether OSC is present). Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007) described many 
samples where Melanie had two simultaneous perspectives, as O’Brien deems “essential” to 
OSC, but at no time did those perspectives involve the as-I-appear-to-others phenomenon that 
O’Brien also holds is essential to OSC. Melanie’s second perspectives were often “me, as I 
appear to me” rather than “me as I appear to others.” For example: 
3.2. Melanie was walking to her car. She was dimly aware, at the moment of the beep, that she 
was walking toward the car. She had an indistinct visual experience of the car, its big black 
shape but not its details. At the center of her experience was a feeling of “fogginess” and worry. 
She described the feeling of fogginess as involving being unable to think with her accustomed 
speed and as feeling “out of synch.” In addition, Melanie was in the act of observing this 
fogginess. Her worry was felt as being behind the eyes, involving a heaviness around the brow 
line. (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 307) 
 Melanie has two perspectives here: (1) foggily seeing the car; and (2) explicitly observing 
the fogginess of the seeing. But the second perspective does not involve an other. It is not her 
thinking about others’ thinking about her, as O’Brien would suggest; it is Melanie thinking about 
Melanie’s own thinking. 
 We don’t presume that ours is an authoritative view of OSC, nor that Melanie has OSC, 
nor that if she has OSC she is typical of all those who so have. But that’s the point: We cannot 
find in O’Brien’s account any recognition of even a potential inadequacy of her method of 
exploring OSC. IPIE can be taken as saying that if one is interested in OSC, and one thinks that 
OSC has experiential components or essentialities, then one should investigate carefully the 
experience of a variety of individuals in a variety of situations. O’Brien does not do that, instead 
appealing to Fitzgerald, Eliot, Nietzsche, and Sartre. IPIE holds that to be inadequate. 
 
Example 4 
The distinction between CatS and IPIE is also clear in Prinz, who, like O’Brien and others, 
neither appeals to a careful apprehension of experience nor recognizes that it might be desirable 
so to do: 
The notion of ownership has been contrasted in cognitive neuroscience with the notion of 
authorship. Ownership is the feeling associated with a mental state belonging to me. Authorship, 
also called “agency,” is the feeling associated with being the author of physical and mental acts. 
It is identified with a feeling of control. I experience some thoughts and actions as issuing from 
me. Like ownership, agency involves a kind of possession: the acts I control are mine. But it is 
an active form of possession, and this, one might think, introduces an entry point for the self. 
With passive perception, the world can pass by the senses without any sense of being a subject, 
but with active agency, the self seems to come in essentially. Perhaps the phenomenal I is an 
experience of oneself as the author…. 
[T]he leading theory of ownership could not explain how a bundle of experiences feel like they 
are mine. Authorship may provide the solution. If I experience two separate bundles of bodily 
perceptions, I can figure out which one is mine by figuring out which one I control. A sense of 
control can provide a greater sense of mineness than mere sensory integration because it brings 
in a motor element that provides for a robust sense of possession; my body is the one that obeys 
my intentions in predictable ways. (Prinz, CatS, pp. 141-142) 
 Might DES (or some other careful way of apprehending pristine experience) be able to 
help Prinz’s conjectures about agency? Prinz does not mention such a possibility, but here is an 
example of how DES might contribute. IPIE (Chapter 6; see also Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 
2007, p. 110) claims that there is a clear experiential distinction between inner speaking and 
inner hearing (a distinction that is rarely made adequately elsewhere). The difference between 
the experience of inner speaking and of inner hearing, DES claims, is as distinct as the difference 
between the experience of speaking into a tape recorder and of hearing your voice played back. 
The inner speaking/inner hearing distinction is largely one of authorship: in inner speaking, 
subjects recognize themselves as the author or the “driver” of the experienced words. In inner 
hearing, subjects feel themselves to be the “receiver” of the words. 
 But there is no distinction, as Prinz might expect, in the phenomenal “I” of inner 
speaking and inner hearing. In both kinds of phenomena, DES subjects recognize that they are in 
fact the creator of the words--inner hearing is not thought insertion or any other psychotic 
symptom. Innerly spoken words are mine; innerly heard words are just as much mine. I feel like 
I am driving my innerly spoken words and receiving my innerly heard words, but in both 
situations the words are equally mine. Thus it seems that Prinz is mistaken, and that DES or 
something like it might have helped him avoid that particular error. 
 There are no authoritative DES views on agency (but see Hurlburt & Raymond, 2011), so 
we happily accept that our conclusion about Prinz might be incorrect. But the point is that we 
cannot find in Prinz’s account any recognition of the desirability of carefully exploring the 
experience of agency. IPIE can be taken as saying that if one is interested in agency, and one 
thinks that agency has experiential components or essentialities, then one should investigate 
carefully the experience of a variety of individuals in a variety of situations. The alternative 
seems to be to rely upon a basis of rather unsatisfactory conjecture. 
 
Investigating experience 
There is of course no requirement that commentators themselves perform the investigations on 
which they comment. So at least part of the reason that the CatS contributions may not cite 
individual observations is that the CatS contributions may rest on the individual observations 
made by others. So, for example, Dretske relies at least in part on the observations of 
“psychologists”: 
One way to proceed in a project of this sort is to look at how we learned we think. We all think 
before we ever discover what thinking is, before we were able to think we (and others) think. So 
at some point in time, during some phase of childhood, we learned that we (and others) think. 
How did we learn this? Who taught us? Parents? Did we take their word for it? Were we already 
aware of our own thoughts as we were of the television and dishwasher and merely had to learn 
(as we did with ordinary household items) what to call them? 
Imagine a normal three-year-old, Sarah, who thinks but has not yet learned she thinks. That one 
thinks is something (psychologists tell us) that one only comes to fully understand around the 
age of three or four years . . . She may use the word “think” (“know” or “hear”) in describing 
herself, but if she does, she does not yet fully understand that what she is giving expression to is 
a fact about herself, a subjective condition having a content (what she thinks) that may be false. 
She will, however, soon acquire this knowledge. (Dretske, CatS, pp. 155-156) 
 IPIE argues (pp. 391-392; see also Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 61) that when 
Sarah uses the word “think” to describe herself, she likely does not mean anything close to 
“know” or “hear,” but instead refers to anything that is ongoing out of sight of others (such as 
feelings, visual imagery, sensory awareness). 
 Dretske’s position that three-year-old Sarah thinks and soon will acquire the knowledge 
that she thinks doubtless follows from work of those like Flavell and colleagues who found that 
the majority of 5-year-olds deny thinking in situation where “having had thoughts . . .was not 
just likely, but virtually certain” (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 2000, p. 108). Flavell and his 
colleagues interpret their findings in the way Dretske describes: that the 5-year-olds were 
thinking but didn’t have the ability to introspect. By contrast, IPIE argues (pp. 145-147, 
summarizing Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, pp. 271-274) that it is entirely possible that 
Flavell’s 5-year-olds deny thinking because they were not thinking--that is, that the Flavell’s 
“virtual certainty” was misplaced. In brief, the IPIE argument is that the Flavells failed 
adequately to bracket their presuppositions about the nature of thinking. 
 There is a profound and curious assumption in Dretske’s (and the Flavells’ and perhaps 
most other developmentalists’) approach: that the chronology is that we think before we 
understand what thinking is, and then, at some future point, we learn that we (and others) think. 
But why must this be the case? And if it must, where and how is it demonstrated? It is certainly 
possible that the young child could think and have the implicit knowledge that others think 
without knowing that she herself is thinking or even, and this is a different point, and one with 
which Dretske agrees, that it is something called ‘thinking’ that is going on. These possibilities 
are sketched in IPIE Chapter 9; for more see, for example, Malloch & Trevarthen (2009) and 
Stuart (2012).
1
 
 The heart of the difference between IPIE and CatS is the differing perspectives on the 
apprehension of inner experience. IPIE holds that inner experience is difficult to apprehend--
IPIE advances a hundred “constraints” that must be taken seriously if experience is to be 
apprehended in high fidelity. CatS (like the tradition in which it exists) does not take those 
constraints adequately seriously and hence it does not take seriously enough the bracketing of 
fundamental presuppositions (as in the Flavell and Dretske examples; see above and Hurlburt & 
Schwitzgebel, 2011a), it relies too heavily on armchair introspection (which IPIE criticizes 
extensively; see also Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, 2011ab), and it assumes that imagined 
thought processes or ‘thinkings’ can stand in place of (salva veritate) the real thing. This is 
certainly not how phenomenological studies are usually conducted, which makes it additionally 
problematic that the “main focus” of CatS is said to be “to investigate ... phenomenological 
routes to the self” (CatS p. 1). 
 We do not hold that DES or the specific constraints advanced in IPIE are the ultimate 
instruments or rules for the investigation of pristine experience (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 
2011b). We certainly welcome alternative methodological attempts, if they are undertaken with a 
sensible rationale and skillful execution. But merely referring to a method as 
“phenomenological” does not imply an adequate attention to the phenomenology in question. 
 We have argued that the CatS contributors do not adequately attend to pristine 
experience. We have not demonstrated, nor do we know, whether a careful attending to 
experiential phenomena will contribute to the science of the self. We have implied above that a 
more careful examination of the phenomena of OSC might broaden the scientific view of OSC 
from a two-perspective view where one of the perspectives is “me, as I appear to others,” to a 
two-perspective view where one of the perspectives might be “me as I appear to me.” And we 
have argued above that DES or something like it might shed light on whether the phenomenal I 
is an experience of oneself as the author. Additionally, the IPIE description of the experience of 
guitarist Ricardo Cobo (Chapter 14) describes Cobo’s multiple simultaneous asynchronous 
streams, no one of which, nor the aggregate, seemed to have an ascendant claim on being or 
reflecting a self. That could be taken as evidence against a unitary self. Furthermore, the IPIE 
discussion of unsymbolized thinking (Chapter 15) could be taken as evidence that selfhood has 
little or nothing to do with language. 
 It is not our intention to presume about the significance, if any, of such examples for the 
understanding of the self. Our intention is to illustrate that carefully collected samples of 
experience might have some significance for the understanding of the self. But the first step is to 
recognize that modern consciousness science for the most part turns a blind eye to such a 
possibility. We have intended our contrasting of IPIE and CatS to contribute to the advance of 
consciousness science by focusing on this important issue. 
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Notes 
1. Stuart (2010, 2012) maintains that thinking and knowing that others are thinking, without 
already knowing, in some explicit conceptual sense, that you are thinking and that others are 
thinking, is what is at the heart of, for example, the affective co-participatory sense-making 
relations between parent and pre-linguistic children, and between pairs (or more) of pre-
linguistic children. 
 Stuart maintains (as do, for example, Bråten, 2009; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; 
Gendlin, 1992; Gomez, 2011; Hodges, 2007; Malloch & Trevarthen, 2009; Maturana, 
1988;Steffensen, Thibault & Cowley, 2010; Stern, 2000, 2010; Thibaul,t 2011; Thompson, 2001; 
Trevarthen, 2012) that thinking is what we do when we try to make sense of our world. It is 
always intentional, it is sometimes reflective, and it always contains pre-reflective, pre-
conceptual sensations and feels. So, when we reach out tentatively with our hands in a darkened 
room we are feeling our way, trying to make sense of our surroundings in community with those 
surroundings. The resistance we feel from the wall and the perturbation to our touch when we 
encounter the switch plate and then the switch, directs and guides our affective haptic inquiry; in 
that sense my perceived world participates in my sense-making activity within “a domain of 
dynamic reciprocal structural coupling” (Maturana 1988, n.p.). 
 This reciprocal sense-making activity is recursively consensual--felt together--when there 
are other agents involved. This affective co-regulation is what Stuart (2010, 2012) has termed 
‘enkinaesthesia’, the reciprocally felt, affective enfolding which enables the balance and counter-
balance, the attunement and co-ordination of whole-body action and interaction through mutual 
adaptation. Taking just one from a wealth of possible examples: 
 Malloch’s theory of communicative musicality (Malloch 1999, Malloch & Trevarthen 
2009)--derived from microanalysis of a proto-conversation between a six-week-old girl and her 
mother--details the expressive parameters that enable the infant, with the support of her mother’s 
affectionate sensibility, to find intersubjective harmony of purpose. They compose a melodic 
story together by sharing the pulse, quality, and narrative of their expressive sounds and 
movements. Gratier has applied similar analysis to vocal dialogues between mothers and infants 
across cultures, with different states of sensitivity or security in intimacy. She shows how, in a 
thriving relationship, mother and infant discover a ‘proto-habitus’, or shared world of meanings, 
as conventions of expression invented in their play (Gratier & Trevarthen 2007, 2008; Gratier & 
Apter-Danon 2009;Trevarthen 2012, pp. 30-1). 
 This pre-reflective formation of a shared world of meanings through a consensual co-
inquiry is possible because we are capable of thinking and knowing that others are thinking, 
without already conceiving of them or us as thinking. And, it is unnecessary that there be a point 
in the future at which we learn explicitly that others think, for it is already implicit in our natural 
plenisentient lived experience with them. 
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